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NYRPL § 226-b: NO RIGHT TO SUBLEASE
WITHOUT CONSENT
I. Introduction
New York City, like other major cities in the United States, suf-
fers from a critical shortage of affordable rental housing.' This
shortage has created a landlord's market, in which apartment own-
ers can select or reject tenants on almost any basis.2 For this rea-
1. The vacancy rate in New York City is approximately 1%. Apartment Crunch Alters
Manhattan Living, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1980, at Al, col. 1. Housing experts say that a
rental vacancy rate below 5% represents a housing crisis. Id. The national apartment va-
cancy rate in March 1979 was 4.8%, the lowest recorded figure. Id., Nov. 18, 1979, § 8, at 8,
col. 5. In Washington, D.C., the vacancy rate has been as low as 1%, 1 UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY II A-43
(1975), and it has been less than 2% in some areas of Chicago. Tamarkin, Condomania in
Chicago, FORBES, Nov. 13, 1978, at 55.
Factors contributing to the depletion of the rental housing supply are: conversions to con-
dominium and cooperative ownership; building abandonments; and reduced construction of
rental buildings by private developers. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 2. For a
discussion of rental apartment conversions, see Comment, The Regulation of Rental Apart-
ment Conversions, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507-62 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Regulation of
Rental Apartment Conversions].
2. Even the tenant's profession has been found to be a legitimate basis upon which a
landlord can discriminate. Kramarsky v. Stahl Mgmt., 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943
(Sup. Ct. 1977). An attorney filed a complaint under the Human Rights Law alleging unlaw-
ful discrimination based on race, sex and marital status. The court held that the landlord
could refuse to rent to a lawyer because she was too intelligent and would be likely to en-
force her rights as a tenant. The court stated "a landlord is free to do what he wishes with
his property, and to rent or not to rent to any given person at his whim... *. He can bar his
premises to the lowest strata of society, should he choose, or to the highest, if that be his
personal desire." 92 Misc. 2d at 1032, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 945. A landlord's right to choose
tenants is limited only by federal, state and local fair-housing and civil-rights legislation.
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) (bars discrimination on the basis of race in
the rental or purchase of privately owned real estate); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Civil Rights
Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. 1980) (extends to tenants pro-
tection against discrimination in the rental, sale or negotiation for housing on the basis of
color, religion, national origin, and sex, although it excludes a substantial group of small
property-owners from its coverage). Under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 those
excluded include: 1) Landlords who live on premises which have four or fewer rental units;
2) Landlords who own or have an interest in three or fewer single-family houses and who do
not sell more than one such house in a two-year period (personal residences are excluded);
3) Landlords whoiare religious or other private organizations who are renting to their own
members on a noncommercial basis. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1)(2) (1976). For a comprehensive
listing of state and local fair-housing and civil-rights acts and a discussion of federal housing
discrimination legislation, see R. BLUMBERG & J. GROW, THE RIGHTS OF TENANTS 104-15
(1978).
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son, tenants are in need of certain protections of their rights. The
New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law ("Rent Control
Law")3 and the New York City Rent Stabilization Law ("Rent Sta-
bilization Law")4 were created to protect tenants against unreason-
able rent increases by strictly regulating the rents landlords could
charge for their apartments. These laws are also intended to pro-
tect tenants from being forced to vacate their apartments by, in
the case of rent controlled tenants, giving them a statutory lease,
and in the case of rent stabilized tenants, guaranteeing them a re-
newal lease.'
Under the present Rent Control Law, a tenant is guaranteed the
right to remain in his apartment, subject to rent increases at the
rate of seven and a half percent per year.' When a tenant vacates a
rent controlled apartment, the apartment becomes decontrolled
and subject to the Rent Stabilization Law.' As long as a tenant of a
rent stabilized apartment occupies the apartment, the Rent Stabi-
lization Code requires that the landlord must offer a renewal lease
of one, two or three years, at the tenant's option,8 at rent increases
of eleven percent, fourteen percent and seventeen percent, respec-
3. Residential Rent Control, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-1.0 to -18.0 (1975 & Supp.
1980).
4. Rent Stabilization, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ YY51-1.0 to -8.0 (1975 & Supp. 1980).
5. Buildings built on or before February 1, 1947 are subject to the Rent Control Law.
Buildings built subsequent to this date are subject to the Rent Stabilization Law. All apart-
ments in rent controlled buildings which became vacant after June 30, 1971 became decon-
trolled and subject to rent stabilization. Thus, almost every building built on or before Feb-
ruary 1, 1947 is subject to both the rent control and rent stabilization laws. NEW YORK CITY
CONCILIATION AND APPEALS BOARD, TENANT'S AND OWNER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER THE
RENT STABILIZATION LAW 3-8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TENANT'S AND OWNER'S RIGHTS AND
DUTIES]. Rent increases are limited to seven and a half percent per year for rent controlled
apartments. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § Y51-5.0(a)(5) (Supp. 1980). The Rent Guidelines Board
establishes a scale of legal rent increases for buildings covered by the Rent Stabilization
Law. For renewal leases taking effect between July 1, 1980 and September 30, 1981 the rates
are: 11% for a one-year renewal; 14% for a two-year renewal; and 17% for a three-year
renewal. New tenants must pay an additional 5% over the renewal for the initial lease. RENT
GUIDELINES BOARD, ORDER No. 12 (eff. July 1, 1980). The Rent Guidelines Board also allows
landlords to charge subtenants an additional 5% subleasing allowance. TENANT'S AND OWN-
ER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra, at 22-25.
6. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § Y51-5.0(a)(5) (1975) & Supp. 1980).
7. TENANT'S AND OWNER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES, supra note 5, at 4.
8. CODE OF THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY STABILIZATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK CITY,
INC. § 23 (1973) (enacted pursuant to N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0 (Supp. 1980)) [here-
inafter cited as Rent Stabilization Code].
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tively. e Increases for rent stabilized apartments are determined
each year by the Rent Guidelines Board. 10 The Rent Stabilization
Law also permits landlords to charge more rent to a new tenant
entering into a "vacancy" lease, than may be charged under a "re-
newal" lease.1 In addition, the Rent Stabilization Law permits
landlords to charge additional increases for a sublease. 2
The New York State Legislature, recognizing that the right to
sublease ensures a tenant's tenure for an apartment, enacted sec-
tion 226-b of the New York Real Property Law in 1975.13 This
statute gives tenants in a dwelling having four or more residential
9. RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, Order No. 12 (eff. July 1, 1980).
10. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-5.0 (1975).
11. RENT STABILIZATION CODE, supra note 8, § 20.
12. RENT STABILIZATION CODE, supra note 8, § 21; TENANT'S AND OWNER'S RIGHTS AND
DUTIES, supra note 5, at 9-14, 22-25. See generally J. GALLET, J. GLASS & M. MINKOWITZ,
RENT STABILIZATION & CONTROL LAWS OF NEW YORK (1973 & Supp. 1980).
13. The full text of Real Property Law § 226-b, as amended, provides:
1. A tenant renting a residence in a dwelling having four or more residential units
shall have the right to sublease or assign his premises, subject to the written consent
of the landlord given in advance of the sublease or assignment. Such consent shall not
be unreasonably withheld. If the landlord unreasonably withholds consent for such
sublease or assignment, the landlord must release the tenant from the lease upon
request of the tenant.
2. The tenant shall inform the landlord of his intent to sublease or assign by mailing
a notice of such intent by registered or certified mail. Such request shall be accompa-
nied by the written consent thereto of any co-tenant or guarantor of such lease and a
statement of the name, business and home address of the proposed sublessee or as-
signee. Within ten days after the mailing of such request, the landlord may ask the
sender thereof for additional information as will enable the landlord to determine if
rejection of such request shall be unreasonable. Within thirty days after the mailing
of the request for consent, or of the additional information reasonably asked for by
the landlord, whichever is later, the landlord shall send a notice to the sender thereof
of his consent or, if he does not consent, his reasons therefor. Landlord's failure to
send such a notice shall be deemed to be a consent to the proposed subletting or
assignment. If the landlord consents, the premises may be sublet or assigned in accor-
dance with the request, but the tenant thereunder shall nevertheless remain liable for
the performance of tenant's obligations under said lease.
3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to leases entered into or renewed
before the effective date of this section, nor to public housing and other units for
which there are constitutional or statutory criteria covering admission thereto nor to
a proprietary lease, viz.: a lease to, or held by, a tenant entitled thereto by reason of
ownership of stock in a corporate owner of premises which operates the same on a
cooperative basis.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (added by L. 1975, N.Y. Laws
ch. 146, eff. June 3, 1975, as amended by L. 1975, N.Y. Laws ch. 548, eff. July 29, 1975 and
L. 1976, N.Y. Laws ch. 198, eff. May 25, 1976).
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units the right to sublease or assign"' their apartments, subject to
the landlord's consent, which cannot be unreasonably withheld.
Section 226-b provides that, "[i]f the landlord unreasonably with-
holds consent for such sublease or assignment, the landlord must
release the tenant from the lease upon the request of the tenant."'"
Thus, the only remedies available to a tenant under section 226-b
are the right to remain in occupancy or to elect to be released from
further leasehold obligations. Some courts, however, have recently
interpreted section 226-b to confer on tenants a broad statutory
right to sublease their apartments upon compliance with the stat-
ute's procedural notification requirements and the landlord's un-
reasonable withholding of consent.16 This interpretation has
caused many landlords and tenants to dispute the legislative intent
of the statute for several reasons.
The basis for these disagreements lies in the economic reality of
the landlord-tenant relationship. First, landlords do not want to
lose their right to select tenants. 7 Second, landlords do not want
to lose the rent increases permitted under. the Rent Stabilization
Law for vacancy leases, which increases are higher than the rents
chargeable to a subtenant under the sublease and subsequent re-
newal lease.' 8 If tenants are permitted to sublet, and thereby ob-
14. The law originally gave tenants the right to sublease. The amendment in 1976 in-'
cluded provisions relating to the right to assign leases. 1976, N.Y. Laws ch. 198.
15. N.Y. R.AL PROP. LAW § 226-b (1) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
16. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Feld-
man v. Simon Bros. Mgmt. Co., N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1980); 68th St.
Co. v. Fyjis-Walker, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 6 (Civ. Ct. 1980). Contra, 68th St. Co.
v. Fyjis-Walkter, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 10, col. 6 (1st Dep't), rev'g N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29,
1980, at 10, col. 6 (Civ. Ct. 1980); Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (1st Dep't Jan.
22, 1981), af'g No. L&T 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980); Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't 1980); 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune and Sac-
camano, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 6 (Civ. Ct.) But see Grayshaw v. New Amster-
dam Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.) (holding that the tenant did not
have the right to assign a lease pursuant to section 226-b regardless of the landlord's unrea-
sonable withholding of consent).
17. See note 2 supra.
18. See note 4 supra. The following examples show how a landlord loses rent increases
on a sublease: Assume a rent-stabilized tenant has a three-year lease at a rent of $500 per
month with one year remaining before expiration, and he wishes to sublet the apartment for
the unexpired lease term. Assuming that the landlord consents to the sublease, he may
charge the subtenant $500 plus a five percent subletting allowance, or $525 per month for
the remainder of the term. RENT GUIDmuNES BOARD, Order No. 12. When the lease expires
after one year, the subtenant has the right to select a renewal lease for a term of one, two or
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tain a guaranteed tenure for their apartments, a landlord cannot
obtain the profits available when an apartment repeatedly changes
hands.19 Third, tenants who must temporarily vacate their apart-
ments want the right to sublet them in order to benefit from lower
rental increases.20 Fourth, with critically low vacancy rates, afford-
able rental housing is almost impossible to find and an apartment
becomes a valuable asset for tenants."1
This Note will discuss the legislative intent of section 226-b.
Specifically it addresses the issue of whether, after a tenant com-
plies with the statute's procedural notification requirements and
the landlord unreasonably withholds consent to the sublease, sec-
tion 226-b gives a residential tenant the right to execute a valid
sublease without the landlord's consent. This Note will analyze the
right to sublease at common law and the statutory right to sub-
lease under section 226-b.2 It will be argued that the legislature
three years at percentage increases of 11%, 14% or 17% respectively. RENT GUIDELINES
BOARD, Order No. 12. The new rent for a one year lease is calculated by using a base rent of
$525 plus $57.75 (11% increase), or $582.75 per month.
Now assume that the subtenancy was not permitted, that the tenant chose to terminate
the lease and that the landlord agreed to rent to the proposed subtenant, under a new two-
year lease. (The option in this instance as to length of the lease term for a new tenancy is
the landlord's). The new rent is calculated by using the base rent of $500 plus $70 (14%
increase) plus $25 (five percent vacancy allowance), or $595 per month. RENT GUIDELINES
BOARD, Order No. 12. Not only is the rent under the new lease in this second example
higher than in the first example, but it is also collectible one year earlier. The gross profit
differential is $977.
Example 1 Example 2
Subtenancy Allowed Subtenancy Refused
Year 1 $525 x 12 = $6300 $595 x 12 = $7140
Year 2 $582.75 x 12 - $6993 $595 x 12 = $7140
Total Rent Payable $13,293 $14,280
for Two Years:
Profit differential: $977
19. See notes 4, 18 supra; Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversions, supra note 1.
20. Residential Rent Control, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-1.0 to 18.0 (1975 & Supp.
1980).
21. See note 1 supra. In Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 295
(Sup. Ct. 1980), the court took judicial notice of the fact that in New York County, there
has been, and still is, a serious shortage of well-maintained residential apartments at reason-
able rents. The court used this fact to arrive at what it termed a fair result. The court
allowed the subtenancy and found that the subject rent stabilized apartment was a valuable
asset as well as a right in inflationary 1980. 105 Misc. 2d at 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
22. An assignment and a sublease can be distinguished by what rights each transfers. An
assignment is a transfer of all the demised premises for the full unexpired term of the lease.
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never intended to give tenants the statutory right to sublease with-
out landlord approval regardless of whether the landlord unreason-
ably withholds consent. Rather, the legislature intended to give a
tenant the right to request permission to sublease, and if such per-
mission is denied, the tenant, not the landlord, may choose to ter-
minate the lease without penalty. The landlord's statutory obliga-
tion is not to consent to the sublease, but to re-let the premises
and thereby eliminate the tenant's damages. A close analysis of the
common law right to sublease, the legislative history of section
226-b, and the cases decided since enactment of the statute
demonstrate that when consent to sublease has been unreasonably
withheld, the tenant has the statutory remedies of terminating the
lease or remaining in occupancy of the apartment, but not of sub-
leasing without landlord approval.
II. The Non-Statutory Right to Sublease
The general common law rule was that in the absence of an ex-
press contractual or statutory restriction, a tenant under a lease for
a definite term has the unrestricted right to assign or sublease his
apartment at will.2 8 Courts have viewed restrictions in a lease
against assignment or subletting as restraints on alienation which
have traditionally been disfavored.2 4 This common law right, how-
A sublease is a transfer of less than all of the tenant's interest: a transfer for less than the
unexpired term of the lease or a transfer of only part of the demised premises. The jurisdic-
tions are divided as to what constitutes a reversion for the purpose of determining whether
an agreement is a sublease or an assignment; and the two terms are often confused by te-
nants, landlords and judges. For a discussion of the distinctions between subleases and as-
signments, see Ferrier Can There Be a Sublease for the Entire Unexpired Portion of a
Term? 18 CALIF. L. Rzv. 1; Wallace, Assignment and Sublease, 8 ND. L.J. 359 (1933). See
also 1 FRIEDMAN ON Lamsaa §§ 7.1-7.4 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 123, at 197 n.15 (3d ed. 1939); 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 37[2] (1968).
23. Presby v. Benjamin, 169 N.Y. 377, 62 N.E. 430, (1902); Riggs v. Pursell, 66 N.Y. 193
(1876). This rule'does not apply to tenancies at will or at sufferance. 18th Ave. Pharmacy v.
Wilmant Realty Corp., 95 N.Y.S. 2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1950); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Re-
porter's Notes § 1.6, at 46-47 (1977).
24. A lease at common law was viewed as a conveyance of an estate in land. The cove-
nants of the parties were independent, and therefore, any common law limitations upon the
right to assign contracts did not limit the right to sublet and assign the leased estate.
Fleisch v. Schnaier, 119 A.D. 815, 104 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st Dep't 1907); Werber v. Weinstein,
207 Misc. 707, 138 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Civ. Ct. 1955). See 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 24611] at 372.85 (1977); MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT CODE § 2-403
(1969). The power of assignment and of subletting has been said to be incident to a lease-
hold estate in the absence of contractual restriction. Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm
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ever, has been limited by the inclusion in leases of express provi-
sions restricting a tenant's right to sublease or assign.2 5 In fact, to-
day it is common for leases to contain such contractual
restrictions.2 6 Where a lease restricts a tenant's right to sublease or
assign by requiring the landlord's consent, and it does not contain
a qualification that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld,
the landlord may arbitrarily refuse his consent for any reason.2
Some courts, however, have implied a requirement that consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld.26 Where the lease provides
that the landlord "shall not unreasonably withhold consent,"
courts require that landlords comply with objective standards of
reasonableness.2 9 Subjective, arbitrary and capricious criteria are
insufficient to restrict a transfer.30 Regarding a lease provision re-
quiring that a landlord shall not unreasonably withhold consent,
one court, nevertheless, stated that
The purpose of the provision is to protect the lessee against liability for
damages or risk of forfeiture if consent of the lessor is improperly with-
held. . . . Nowhere does the lessor expressly covenant not to withhold his
consent unreasonably. The only covenant is by [the tenant] not to sublet
and it is [the tenant's) own covenant that is qualified by the condition that
the lessor shall not unreasonably withhold consent. 1
Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
25. See J. MEEHAN, WEsT'S McKINzyv's FORMS, Real Property Practice § 6:20 (1980).
26. Id.
27. Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 16 A.D.2d 899, 228 N.Y.S.2d 807
(1st Dep't 1962), afl'd, 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963); Singer Sew-
ing Mach. Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Ogden v. Riverview Holding Corp., 134 Misc. 149, 234 N.Y.S. 678 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 226 A.D.
882, 235 N.Y.S. 850 (lst Dep't 1929); Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup.
Ct. 1924).
28. Rowe v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 N.Y.2d 62, 385 N.E.2d 566, 412 N.Y.S.2d 827
(1978); Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N.Y. 516, 159 N.E. 416 (1927); American Book Co. v.
Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
29. For a discussion of the reasonableness of landlord's refusal to consent to a subletting
or assignment, see Kehr, Lease Assignments: The Landlord's Consent, 55 CAIF. STATE B.J.
108 (1980); Todres & Lerner, The Assignment and Subletting of Leased Premises: The
Unreasonable 'Withholding of Consent, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195 (1977). Cf. Wilkinson,
Refusal of Consent to Sublet, 129 N~w L.J. 955 (discussion of unreasonable withholding of
consent to sublease in England). See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679 (1973); Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 831 (1970).
30. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d at 34, 297
N.Y.S.2d at 161.
31. Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. at 470, 205 N.Y.S. at 761.
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A provision requiring a landlord not to unreasonably withhold con-
sent to a sublease may be construed as a covenant by the landlord
breach of which gives the tenant an action for damages."s In the
alternative, such a provision may be deemed a negative qualifica-
tion of the tenant's covenant not to sublease or assign whereby the
landlord can unreasonably refuse consent without incurring liabil-
ity for damages.3
In American Book Co. v. Yeshiva University Development
Foundation, Inc., 4 a decision concerning the non-statutory right
to sublease, the lessor, an affiliate of an orthodox Jewish institu-
tion, refused to permit a sublease to the Planned Parenthood
Foundation of America.3 5 The court held that the lessor was re-
quired to accept the Planned Parenthood Foundation as a subles-
see because its reasons for refusal were subjective; rejection of a
proposed tenant on the basis of the dislikes of a landlord could not
be sanctioned by the court.3 In so doing, the court found that
landlord's refusal to consent fell into two broad categories: objec-
tive and subjective.3 7 Objective standards included: financial re-
32. The English rule, which has been codified, is that a covenant against assignment
without the landlord's consent is deemed to provide that the landlord's consent is not to be
unreasonably withheld. Treloar v. Bigge, L.R. 9 Ex. 151 (1873); LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT
(1927), 17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch. 36 § 19[1], noted in 1 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 192 n.3. Compare
Shakers Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime.& Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584 (1971)
(adopting English rule) with Broad & Branford Place Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132
N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (1944) (refusing to follow English rule) and Arlu Associates, Inc. v.
Rosner, 14 A.D.2d 272, 275, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288, 291 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 693,
185 N.E.2d 913, 233 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1962) (overruling lower New York courts which have
adopted the English rule and following the rationale of Broad & Branford). See also 2 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 246[1], at 372.90 (1977).
33. Speare v. Consolidated Assets Corp., 360 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1966); Passaic Distribs.,
Inc. v. Sherman Co., 386 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Arlu Assocs., Inc. v. Rosner, 14
A.D.2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 693, 185 N.E.2d 913, 233
N.Y.S.2d 477 (1962); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158
N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
34. 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 38, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
37. Id. at 33, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 160. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Tager, 46 Misc. 2d 658, 260
N.Y.S.2d 413 (Civ. Ct. 1965) (holding that the proposed use of the leased space for subdivi-
sion into multiple subtenancies gave the landlord the basis for a reasonable withholding of
consent). In American Book, the court also found § 259-b of the Real Property Law to be
applicable stating: "That section, by prohibiting restraints on the assignment, conveyance,
ownership, lease, rental, use or occupancy of real property to or by any person because of
race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry," which are "declared to be void as against
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sponsibility; the "identity" or "business character" of the subten-
ant, including his suitability for the particular building; legality of
the proposed use; and the nature of the occupancy.3 8 Subjective
criteria, such as the landlord's needs, dislikes, personal taste, sensi-
bility or convenience, however, were unacceptable bases upon
which to predicate a refusal.39
More recently, in Feldman v. Simon Brothers Management
Co., 40 a New York court also applied the common law rule. In
Feldman, two tenants in the same building wished to exchange
apartments for "sensible personal reasons" by subletting to each
other.41 The landlord refused permission, without giving a "single
factual reason" for its withholding of consent to the subleases.42
Both tenants had identical subletting provisions contained in rid-
ers to their leases, which required the landlord's consent to a sub-
letting, which consent was not to be unreasonably withheld. 3 The
clauses provided:
Landlord agrees not to unreasonably withhold consent to subletting of
premises. However, upon privilege of subletting the stabilization rent paya-
ble to landlord effective upon date of subletting shall be established as if
renewal lease had been a vacancy lease.
4 4
The Feldman court found that section 226-b did not apply in a
case where the lease contained a covenant by the landlord ex-
pressly agreeing not to unreasonably withhold consent to sublet-
ting. Rather, the Feldman court interpreted the meaning of the
landlord's covenant relying on the common law rule:
Where a landlord has agreed not to withhold his consent unreasonably,
public policy" rules out criteria not only of purely subjective dislikes, but also of doctrinal
differences for "creed," broadly speaking, refers to a body of religious, philosophical, scien-
tific or political opinions and beliefs. 59 Misc. 2d at 35, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 161 (construing
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 259-b (McKinney 1968)); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679 (1973).
38. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ., Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d at 33, 297
N.Y.S.2d at 160.
39. "To the extent that rejection of a proposed subtenancy is based upon the supposed
needs or dislikes of the landlord, a policy of judicial disapproval of such subjective criteria is
discernible." Id. at 34, 297 N.Y.S. 2d at 161. Accord, Cedarhurst Park Apts., Inc. v. Milgrim,
55 Misc. 2d 118, 284 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
40. N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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and violates such agreement, the courts have held that the tenant may ei-
ther ignore the restrictive covenant and sublet the premises, or may sue for
a declaratory judgment under the CPLR to determine whether or not the
landlord's consent is being reasonably withheld.45
The landlord argued that notwithstanding the lease provisions,
under section 226-b the tenant's only remedy when a subletting is
unreasonably refused is to vacate the apartment and to terminate
the lease.4" The court disagreed with the landlord's contention,
however, and granted the tenants a declaratory judgment permit-
ting them to exchange apartments.
Thus, absent any statutory restriction, where a landlord agrees
in the lease not to unreasonably withhold consent to a sublease
and violates such agreement, the tenant has several available reme-
dies.4 First, the tenant can ignore the landlord's refusal and sublet
or assign the premises without approval.4 If the landlord com-
mences an action alleging an illegal sublease, the tenant has the
burden of proof as to whether consent has been unreasonably with-
held. 0 This is a question of fact and courts consider all of the cir-
cumstances, including, most importantly, the specific language of
the lease provision. 1 Second, the tenant can sue for a declaratory
judgment"2 to determine whether consent has been unreasonably
45. Feldman v. Simon Bros. Mgmt. Co., N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.)
(quoting 34 NEW YORK JuR. Landlord & Tenant § 266 (1964)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally 1 RASCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 266-269 (2d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT]. An example of a statutory restric-
tion on the right to sublease is found in the Rent Control Law which prohibits rent con-
trolled tenants from subleasing their apartments. N.Y.C. RENT AND EvIcTION REOS. § 33.3
(these regulations may be found following N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 8617 (McKinney 1974));
Emtico Assoc. v. Gabel, 47 Misc. 2d 577, 262 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1965), affd, 25 A.D.2d
718, 269 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1st Dep't 1966).
49. Mann v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Butterick Pub. Co.
v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Sarner v. Kan-
tor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1924). See Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel
Martinique Assocs., 16 A.D.2d 899, 228 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1st Dep't 1962), afl'd, 12 N.Y.2d 339,
239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 831, 835 (1953).
50. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158 N.Y.S.2d 647
(Sup. Ct. 1957); Mann v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
51. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158 N.Y.S.2d 647
(Sup. Ct. 1957); Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S.
86 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
52. The supreme court may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final
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withheld.5 3 Third, some courts permit tenants to recover damages"
or maintain an action for specific performance of the agreement.55
III. The Right to Sublease Under Section 226-b
Section 226-b provides that, "if the landlord unreasonably with-
holds consent for [the proposed] sublease or assignment, the land-
lord must release the tenant from the lease upon request of the
tenant."'  Two recent decisions, Pacer Realty Associates v.
judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. If the court declines to render such a
judgment it shall state its grounds. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3001 (McKinney 1974).
53. NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT, supra, note 48, §§ 266-269 (2d ed. 1971).
54. The damage remedy will not be discussed in this Note. See generally notes 30-31
supra and accompanying text.
55. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Eastway Plaza, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 509, 158 N.Y.S.2d 647
(Sup. Ct. 1957); Mann v. Steinberg, 188 Misc. 652, 64 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Butterick
Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Sarner
v. Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
56. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Many jurisdictions have
enacted statutes that govern the right to sublease and assign. The provisions generally fall
into three categories, which are not mutually exclusive. First, statutes which provide that
the landlord cannot unreasonably withhold his consent to a transfer by the tenant include:
ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5512(b) (1975); HAWAHI REv.
STAT. § 516-63 (Supp. 1975) (long-term lease of residential lots only); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981) (subletting under certain circumstances) and § 236
(McKinney 1968) (transfer of leasehold of deceased tenant by executor of estate). See
MODEL RESIDENTiAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403 (1969). Second, statutes which ex-
pressly provide that the tenant is free to transfer his interest unless the parties agree other-
wise include: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 5512(a) (1975); HAWAii REv. STAT. § 516-63 (Supp.
1975) (applies only to long-term leases of residential lots; certain formalities required, but
consent not necessary); and § 521-37 (Supp. 1975) (applies to all other residential leases);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2725 (West 1952); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp.
1980-1981) and § 236 (McKinney 1968) (tenant free to sublease, consent not to be unreason-
ably withheld; right of executor to transfer leasehold of deceased tenant); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 31, § 4035 (1968) (subletting). See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403
(1969). Third, statutes which provide that the tenant cannot transfer without the landlord's
consent (interests so restricted are referred to parenthetically in connection with each stat-
ute) include: ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975) (a leasehold interest); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-101
(1966) (a usufruct; term for less than five years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2511 (1964) (term
not exceeding two years, at will, or by sufferance); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.180(2) (1972)
(term at will, by sufferance, or for less than two years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441.030 (Vernon
1952) (term not exceeding two years, at will, or by sufferance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41 § 10
(West 1954) (term not exceeding two years, at will, or by sufferance); S.C. CODE § 41-56
(Supp. 1975) (any sublease without landlord's consent deemed a nullity with respect to
landlord's rights); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5237 (Vernon 1962) (any person renting); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 704.09(1) (West Special Pamphlet 1975) (tenancy at will; any periodic tenancy
less than year-to-year). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Notes
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Lasky57 and 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune and Saccamano5 8 inter-
preted the right to sublease under section 226-b.
In Lasky, the subtenant moved into her apartment after the ten-
ant vacated it.59 Both the tenant and the subtenant had contacted
the managing agent to get approval for the change and were told
that subletting in the building was forbidden. 0 Nevertheless, the
subtenant moved into the apartment because the tenant's lease
had not expired and she believed she had the right to sublet."
The landlord commenced an action to evict the subtenant and to
recover possession of the apartment on the ground that the sublet
was in violation of the written lease." Because the lease was not
part of the record, the facts did not indicate whether there was a
lease provision in which the landlord agreed not to unreasonably
withhold consent to a sublease.63 The court, relying on section 226-
b," held that the subletting was illegal.65 In so doing, the court
stated:
A careful reading of the statute is clear and unambiguous that in the event
of a landlord who unreasonably withholds his consent to a sub-let, the ten-
ant has the option to remain as the tenant, or be released from any further
obligation under the lease. There can be no other logical interpretation of
the statute."
The Lasky court followed 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune and Sac-
§§ 15.1-15.2 (1976).
57. No. 80-436 (1st Dep't, Jan. 22, 1981), a/f'd No. L. & T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29,
1980).
58. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 6 (Civ. Ct.).
59. At the trial, the parties agreed that there were no issues of fact involved. Respon-
dent's Post Trial Memorandum of Law at 1, Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. L. & T.
32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980); Court Rules Out Subletting Without Landlord Approval,
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1980, at B1, col. 5.
60. Respondent's Post Trial Memorandum of Law at 1, Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky,
No. L. & T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980).
61. The subtenant offered to sign a three-year lease with a rent increase of 30%, the
maximum increase allowed by the Rent Stabilization Law. The landlord declined the offer
saying that there was a waiting list for apartments in the building. N.Y. Times, June 4,
1980, at B1, col. 6.
62. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. L. & T. 32683-80, slip op. at 1 (Civ. Ct., May 29,
1980).
63. Id. at 1-2; No. 436-80, slip op. at i-iii, 1-5 (1st Dep't Jan. 22, 1981).
64. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
65. No. L. & T. 32683-80, slip. op. at 1.
66. Id.
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camano,67 where the lease contained the following provision:
Except as provided by section 226-b of the Real Property Law of New
York, Tenant shall not assign the Lease, nor sublet the Apartment or any
part thereof to be used by anyone other than the Tenant or members of the
immediate family of the Tenant, without the prior written consent of the
Landlord in each case."
The lease did not contain a covenant by the landlord not to unrea-
sonably withhold consent toa sublease. The tenant in Braune, in
compliance with the notice requirements of section 226-b(2), 69 in-
formed her landlord by certified mail of her intention to sublease. 0
The landlord refused to consent to the proposed subletting on two
grounds: first, that the landlord had not given permission, and sec-
ond, that the tenant failed to comply with the law governing sub-
lets and leases.7 ' Nevertheless, the tenant sublet and the landlord
instituted a holdover proceeding against the tenant and the sub-
tenant.72 The tenant moved for summary judgment, and the court
granted the motion but terminated the subtenancy.738
The threshold issue in Braune was whether the landlord had
reasonably withheld consent to the subletting. ' Applying the "rea-
sonableness test" set forth in American Book 75 the court found as
a matter of law that the landlord unreasonably withheld its con-
sent.7" The court, however, then applied section 226-b, and held
that, despite its finding that the landlord had unreasonably with-
held consent, the tenant's only remedies in such a situation are to
remain as tenant under the lease, or to demand that the landlord
67. 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune and Saccamano, N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 6 (Civ.
Ct.).
68. Id.
69. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 226-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
70. N.Y.L.J., July 17, 1980, at 11, col. 6.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 12, col. 1.
74. Id. at 11, col. 6.
75. See notes 32-37 supra and accompanying text. The Braune court found that the
reasons given by the landlord did not address any of the standards enunciated by American
Book and that there was nothing in the record suggesting that the proposed subtenant
would be manifestly objectionable under any of the American Book standards. N.Y.L.J.,
July 17, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
76. Id.
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release the tenant from the lease."
The court in Kruger v. Page Management Co.,78 however, inter-
preted section 226-b to permit a tenant to sublet when a landlord
unreasonably withholds consent. In Kruger, the tenant had a
three-year lease for a rent stabilized apartment.79 The lease con-
tained the following clauses respecting the tenant's occupancy of
the apartment:
Clause 2
The Apartment shall be occupied only by Tenant and immediate
family of Tenant for living purposes only.80
Clause 18
Except as provided by section 226-b of the Real Property Law of
New York, Tenant shall not ... sublet the apartment ... without
the prior written consent of Owner.81
Clause 31
The demised premises are rented and shall be occupied in accor-
dance with Clause #2 and the Tenant agrees to adhere to the restric-
tion against assignment or subletting."
The lease did not impose on the landlord a duty not to unrea-
sonably withhold consent to a sublease. On May 6, 1980, the ten-
ant notified the landlord's managing agent of his intent to sublease
the apartment to a married couple, commencing July 1, 1980.8 In
compliance with section 226-b, the tenant included the names and
home addresses of the proposed sublessees who were a medical stu-
77. This is consistent with an informational "Rent Stabilization Rider for Apartment
House Tenants in New York City" (eff. May 6, 1980). The rider, approved under the Rent
Stabilization Law by the Commissioner of the New York City Dep't of Housing Preservation
and Development, provides:
(b)(2) Subletting
The owner has the right to grant a tenant permission to sublet or upon request, to
cancel the lease. If the lease does not give the tenant permission to sublet, the owner
may refuse such permission. However, where the owner is not required by the lease to
permit subletting, the tenant may be entitled to sublet or have the lease canceled by
following the steps set forth in section 226-b of the New York Real Property Law.
Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 26-27, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 304 (Sup. Ct. 1980). See
also Rent Stabilization Law, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § YY51-6.0(d) (Supp. 1980).
78. 105 Misc. 2d 14, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
79. Id. at 15, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
80. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 12, Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14,
432 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
81. Id. at 16, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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dent and an elementary school teacher." On May 15, 1980, the
landlord's managing agent advised the tenant by mail that "we do
not grant you permission to sublet the apartment. We do not
choose to have apartments passed from hand to hand." 86 Five days
later, the tenant commenced an action for a declaratory judgment
and an injunction to compel the landlord and the managing agent
to consent to the proposed sublease.86 The plaintiff asked the court
to determine whether he could sublease: 1) pursuant to section
226-b; 2) pursuant to the lease between himself and the landlord;
or 3) pursuant to both section 226-b and the lease."
The court held that under section 226-b, upon the tenant's satis-
factory compliance with the statute's notice requirements, the
landlord had thirty days to notify the tenant of consent, to reason-
ably request additional information," or to notify tenant of factual
and objective reasons for withholding consent.89 In so doing, the
court found that the tenant duly complied with the requirements
of section 226-b, and that the landlord's unreasonable withholding
of consent was "deemed, as a matter of law, under section 226-b, a
consent to tenant's request for a sublease to the proposed subles-
sees only, subject to tenant's timely compliance with all of the
other terms, covenants and conditions of the subject lease."' 0
84. Id.
85. Id. at 17, 432 N.Y.S. at 298.
86. Id.
87. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 2-3, Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d 14,
432 N.Y.S. 2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
88. 105 Misc. 2d at 33-34, 432 N.Y.S. 2d at 308. The statute provides that a landlord
may request additional information, or must notify tenant of consent to the sublease, within
30 days of the tenant's request. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981).
89. 105 Misc. 2d at 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
90. Id. The Kruger court adopted the reasonableness test of American Book Co. v.
Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d at 34, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 163, and found that
to negate an unreasonable withholding of consent under § 226-b, "reasons shall be factual
and objective, based upon the proposed sublessee(s), financial responsibility, identity or
suitability for the particular apartment or building, legality of the proposed use or nature of
the occupancy or any other sound real estate business, excepting loss of profit or property
control." 105 Misc. 2d at 34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308. The court only allowed the tenant, how-
ever, to charge the rent that he was paying for the apartment. Id. This appears to be con-
trary to RENT GUIDELINEs BOARD, Order No. 12 (eff. July 1, 1980) which provides that the
landlord is entitled to a five percent subleasing allowance. It is unclear whether the court
intended that the tenant should pay the landlord the extra five percent or whether, in fact,
the court ruled that the landlord was not entitled to the five percent subleasing allowance.
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The Kruger court also relied on Feldman,9 where the lease con-
tained an express covenant by the landlord not, to unreasonably
withhold consent. 2 The lease in Kruger, however, did not contain
a similar provision. The common law rule followed by Feldman
only applies when such a provision is present and is violated by the
landlord.s Therefore, the Kruger court arguably should not have
relied on Feldman.
The Kruger court extended the provisions of section 226-b by
holding that, in addition to the failure to send either a notice of
consent or an explanation for the withholding of consent, a land-
lord's unreasonably withholding consent would be deemed to be
consent to the sublease.94 In effect, the court held that landlords
cannot unreasonably refuse tenants permission to sublease.
A. The Right of Assignment Under Section 226-b
A case interpreting the remedies available under section 226-b,
but in the context of an assignment, is Grayshaw v. New Amster-
dam Apartments Co.95 In Grayshaw, the tenant chose to assign his
lease, which contained a provision and two riders limiting the ten-
ant's rights to assign and sublease." The lease, a standard Real
Estate Board form, provided that the tenant agreed:
[1]t shall not assign . . . this agreement, nor underlet, or suffer or permit
the premises or any part thereof to be used by others, without the prior,
written consent of the landlord in each instance. 7
There was nothing in this provision requiring the landlord not to
unreasonably withhold his consent. The first rider provided:
[T]he Landlord agree[s] to not unreasonably withhold approval of said
subletting. Before this clause shall be binding on the Landlord, the Land-
lord shall have the right to issue a release to the Tenant and take back the
apartment.98
The Kruger court limited its holding to subleases only, noting that it passed no decision on
the assignment of leases. 105 Misc. 2d at 23, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
91. Id. at 31-32, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 307.
92. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 23-31 supra and accompanying text.
94. 105 Misc. 2d at 34-35, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308-09.
95. Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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The second rider provided:
[N]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the sublet and
assignment clauses of this letter tenant's right to sublet the premises shall
be governed by section 226-b of the Real Property Law of the State of New
York. . .[landlord] reserves the right to reject any proposed subtenant and
take back the apartment and release the tenant."
The lease required, therefore, the landlord's consent to an assign-
ment or sublease but it did not burden him with a duty to reason-
ably consent to an assignment or sublease.100
The tenant notified the landlord, by letter, of his intention to
assign the lease to a proposed assignee.101 The landlord had previ-
ously rejected another proposed subtenant or assignee, and again
rejected the proposed assignment, offering instead to terminate the
tenant's lease and to enter into a new lease with the "prospective
subtenant." 102 The tenant subsequently notified the landlord that
he had assigned the remainder of the lease term to the proposed
assignee and enclosed the assignee's check for the rent.103 The ten-
ant commenced an action for a declaratory judgment and moved
for summary judgment before joinder of issue.10' The court held
that although the landlord unreasonably withheld consent, the ten-
ant did not have the right to assign the lease. The court stated:
99. Id.
100. "Clearly then the lease creates no right to assign or sublet 'without landlord's prior,
written consent' and the landlord's consent is not subject to a test of reasonableness." Id.
(quoting the tenant's lease).
101. Id.
102. The correspondence of the parties relating to the first proposed subtenant or as-
signee was not made available to the court. Id. at 5, col. 4 n.1. The landlord's letter rejecting
the second proposed assignment invited the tenant to test § 226-b in court, stating:
As we indicated in our letter to you of Oct. 10, 1980, we must reiterate our position
wherein we rejected your subtenant and released you from your lease effective 11-30-
80. If you desire to test 226-b in a court of law, we are certainly prepared to meet you
in court. We are prepared to offer your prospective subtenant the right to enter into a
new lease effective Dec. 1, 1980 at the approved Rent Stabilization increase.
Id. at 5, col. 2. The landlord also confused the terms subtenant and assignee, because the
tenant requested an assignment of the lease, but the landlord in the above correspondence
twice referred to the proposed assignee as a subtenant. Id.
103. Id.
104. The court allowed the parties to chart their own course of litigation. Because the
landlord (defendants) did not oppose the procedure and acknowledged that the issues in the
motion were solely legal issues, the court stated that there was no reason not to declare the
rights of the parties as was demanded in the complaint. Id.
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Unreasonable as he was, the landlord had the arbitrary right to consent or
withhold consent to the assignment. The consequences of its unreasonable-
ness is [sic] that [the tenant] may stay or [the tenant] may leave, but [the
assignee] has no rights in the premises.105
In so ruling, the court followed the First Department's rulings in
Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman'" and Pacer Realty Associates v.
Lasky' 07 regarding the tenant's remedies under section 226-b.1'0
The Grayshaw court found the facts in Kruger to be in no mate-
rial way distinguishable from the case at bar. The court, however,
did not follow Kruger's interpretation of section 226-b, nor did it
follow Lexann's interpretation that the statute was intended to
limit a tenant's contactual right to sublet at common law.' 09 In
seeking to interpret the legislative intent of a statute which was
"less than clear," the Grayshaw court resorted to rules of statutory
interpretation.10 In dicta, the court stated that had the parties
agreed on how to deal with assignment and subletting, the court
would have attempted to enforce their agreement as made, thereby
protecting the tenant's contractual rights."'
In interpreting section 226-b, the court found that the statute's
purpose was clearly remedial."' Finding it apparent from the his-
tory of the statute, as well as from section 236 of the Real Property
Law, which concerns the assignment of leaseholds of deceased te-
nants, the court stated:
[Section 226-b] was enacted to permit a tenant who no longer had use for
an apartment to obtain reasonable relief by either finding a suitable subten-
ant or assignee or by procuring his own release from further obligation."'
105. Id. at 5, col. 3.
106. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't).
107. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (1st Dep't Jan. 22, 1981), afg No. L. &
T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980).
108. Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 3.
109. Id. at 5, cols. 2, 4 n.2.
110. Id. at 5, col. 2.
111. Id. at 5, col. 2, 4 n.2.
112. Id. at 5, col. 2.
113. Id. at 5, col. 3. Section 236 provides:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision contained in any lease hereafter made
which affects premises demised for residential use, or partly for residential and partly
for professional use, the executor, administrator or legal representative of a deceased
tenant under such a lease, may request the landlord thereunder to consent to the
assignment of such a lease, or to the subletting of the premises demised thereby. Such
request shall be accompanied by the written consent thereto of any co-tenant or guar-
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If the legislature had intended that landlords be required to con-
sent to subleases and assignments, this intention would have been
made clear. The court found, however, that the legislature pro-
vided the tenant with the statutory remedies of remaining as ten-
ant or being released from the lease.114 Therefore, under section
226-b when a landlord unreasonably withholds consent, the intent
of the legislature was not to give tenants the right to "trade in
leases despite their contracts to the contrary.''H6
IV. Cases Interpreting the Right to Sublease Under
Section 226-b Following Kruger
A. Lower Courts
Kruger held that section 226-b, as amended, prohibits a landlord
from unreasonably withholding consent to a sublease."' The court
antor of such lease and a statement of the name, business and home addresses of the
proposed assignee or sublessee. Within ten days after the mailing of such request, the
landlord may ask the sender thereof for additional information as will enable the
landlord to determine if rejection of such request shall be unreasonable. Within thirty
days after the mailing of the request for consent, or of the additional information
reasonably asked for by the landlord, whichever is later, the landlord shall send a
notice to the sender thereof of his election to terminate said lease or to grant or
refuse his consent. Landlord's failure to send such a notice shall be deemed to be a
consent to the proposed assignment or subletting. If the landlord consents, said lease
may be assigned in accordance with the request provided a written agreement by the
assignee assuming the performance of the tenant's obligations under the lease is de-
livered to the landlord in form reasonably satisfactory to the landlord, or the prem-
ises may be sublet in accordance with the request, as the case may be, but the estate
of the deceased tenant, and any other tenant thereunder, shall nevertheless remain
liable for the performance of tenant's obligations under said lease. If the landlord
terminates said lease or unreasonably refuses his consent, said lease shall be deemed
terminated, and the estate of the deceased tenant and any other tenant thereunder
shall be discharged from further liability thereunder as of the last day of the calendar
month during which the landlord was required hereunder to exercise his option. If
the landlord reasonably refuses his consent, said lease shall continue in full force and
effect, subject to the right to make further requests for consent hereunder. Any re-
quest, notice or communication required or authorized to be given hereunder shall be
sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. This act shall not apply
to a proprietary lease, viz.: a lease to, or held by, a tenant entitled thereto by reason
of ownership of stock in a corporate owner of premises which operates the same on a
cooperative basis. Any waiver of any part of this section shall be void as against pub-
lic policy (eff. Miy 11, 1965).
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1968).
114. Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 3.
115. Id.
116. See notes 78-94 supra and accompanying text.
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decided that, as a matter of law, a landlord's unreasonable refusal
of tenant's request to a sublease operated as a consent to the sub-
lease. 117 The court held that under section 226-b, where a landlord
unreasonably withholds consent to a sublease, the tenant's reme-
dies are: 1) to remain as tenant under the lease; 2) to demand that
the landlord release the tenant from the lease; or 3) execute a valid
sublease. 8 Subsequent decisions agree with Kruger that section
226-b permits a tenant to obtain a release from the lease or to re-
main as tenant under the lease. 119 All of these cases, however, are
not in agreement that section 226-b gives a tenant the option of
executing a valid sublease upon a landlord's unreasonable
refusal.120
The Kruger court's interpretation of section 226-b was followed
in 68th Street Co. v. Fyjis-Walker,1 21 where the tenant wished to
sublet the apartment to a proposed subtenant for the remainder of
the lease, which was to expire in February, 1980.122 The facts do
not indicate whether there was a subletting provision of any kind
in the tenant's lease.
The tenant notified the landlord in writing that he expected to
leave the apartment and requested that the landlord accept the
subtenant as a sublessee or as a new lessee.123 The landlord never
responded. 2" The tenant then advised the landlord that he had
117. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 34-35, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308-09.
118. Id. at 33-35, 432 N.Y.S. 2d at 308-09.
119. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (1st Dep't Jan. 22, 1981), affg No. L. &
T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980); Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18,
1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't); 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col.
6 (Civ. Ct.). See Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 2
(Sup. Ct.) (interpreting the right to assign a lease under section 226-b).
120. Compare 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 6 (Civ. Ct.)
(allowing the tenant to validly sublease under § 226-b upon the landlord's unreasonable
withholding of consent) with Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (1st Dep't Jan. 22,
1981), aff'g No. L. & T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980) and Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitch-
man, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't) (holding that the tenant has no right
to sublease under § 226-b when the landlord unreasonably withholds consent). But cf.
Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.) (holding
that the tenant has no right to assign a lease under § 226-b when the landlord unreasonably
withholds consent).
121. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1980, at 10, col. 6 (Civ. Ct.).
122. Id. at 11, col. 1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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sublet the apartment.'"5 An additional notice was sent to the land-
lord by the tenant's attorneys." The landlord notified the tenant's
attorneys that he would not consent to the sublet and gave no rea-
son for his decision." 7 The landlord rejected the subtenant's
tender of rent and the landlord's attorneys notified the tenant that
the lease would be cancelled upon thirty days' written notice, stat-
ing, "the landlord makes it a policy not to accept subleases or as-
signment of leases. '' 28 The landlord brought an action to evict the
subtenant on the grounds of an alleged illegal subtenancy."'
The court held that the subtenant was entitled to a renewal
lease because the landlord's reason for refusing consent to the sub-
lease was unreasonable per se, and that under section 226-b, the
unreasonable withholding of consent is prohibited and is deemed
to be consent to the sublease.' 80 Relying on Kruger and Feldman
as authority, the Fyjis-Walker court stated:
[Real Property Law] section 226-b is designed to afford relief to a tenant
who wants to discontinue his/her tenancy during the term of the lease. It
permits tenants to find suitable subtenants as replacements. Where [the]
landlord, by action or inaction, consents to the sublet, the original tenant
continues to remain 'liable for the performance of tenant's obligations under
said lease.' Where the landlord unreasonably withholds permission to sub-
let, [the] tenant has the option of treating this as a consent to sublet or of
notifying landlord that he/she chooses to be released from the lease. 1 "
In so ruling, the Fyjis-Walker court, like the Kruger court, erred
in its reliance on Feldman.'82 Feldman construed a lease provision
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The court found that although the notice sent by the tenant to the landlord may
have been insufficient, the notice sent by the tenant's attorneys satisfied the requirements of
§ 226-b. Id.
130. Pursuant to the RENT STABILIZATION CODE, supra note 8, § 54(e) (1973), the land-
lord had applied to the New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board ("CAB") for a de-
termination that the apartment was no longer the tenant's primary residence. The landlord
obtained a decision in his favor based solely upon information which he had submitted, and
the CAB excused the landlord from renewing the tenant's lease. The court held, however,
that the subtenant became a legal subtenant before the landlord filed its application with
the CAB. Because the landlord failed to notify the subtenant of the proceeding, the decision
of the Board could have no effect on his tenancy. Id.
131. Id.
132. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
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which required the landlord not to unreasonably withhold consent
to a sublease,"' but the courts in Kruger and Fyjis-Walker were
not presented with similar provisions and the cases should have
been governed solely by section 226-b and its statutory remedies. 3
B. The Appellate Term
In Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman,5 the First Department
was confronted with a lease provision that prohibited subletting
without the landlord's consent, which consent was not to be unrea-
sonably withheld. The lease provided:
Tenant shall not assign this agreement, or sublet the premises, or any
part thereof, without the landlord's consent in writing. . . .Landlord shall
not unreasonably withhold consent to subletting.8 6
The tenant sought permission to sublease but the landlord re-
fused.1 87 Despite the landlord's refusal to consent, the tenant sub-
let the apartment.13 8 The landlord brought an action for use and
occupancy.13 9
The lower court had found that the landlord, by refusing to con-
sent to the sublease to either the proffered subtenant or any other
subtenant, unreasonably withheld consent.1 40 The trial court, how-
ever, held that under section 226-b, where a landlord unreasonably
withholds consent to a sublease the tenant's sole remedies are to
terminate the lease or to remain in occupancy.""
As a consequence of the court's decision the landlord was
awarded possession of the apartment and a monetary award of
133. Id.
134. See notes 78-94 supra and accompanying text. In fact, the First Department has
reversed Fyjis-Walker on precisely these grounds. The court held that a landlord can refuse
to permit a sublease for any reason, provided it offers to release the primary tenant from the
lease. 68th St. Co. v. Fyjis-Walker, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 10, col. 6 (1st Dep't). See notes
135-152 infra and accompanying text.
135. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't).
136. Id. at 12, col. 1 (Asch, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 11, col. 3.
138. Id.
139. Id. "Use and occupation" is a term used to define a quasi-contractual action by a
landlord against one who occupies an apartment under an express or implied contract to
pay for the same, but not under a lease which would support an action for rent. See
Thackray v. Ritz, 130 Misc. 403, 403, 223 N.Y.S. 668, 669 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
140. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't).
141. Id.
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four month's rent based on a vacancy lease increase. 142 The tenant
appealed and the First Department affirmed the judgment but re-
duced the award holding that although the tenant sublet the
apartment illegally, the landlord could not charge the tenant rent
for the period of illegal occupancy at a rate equal to a vacancy
increase.14 8 Rather, the landlord was only entitled to rent for this
period in an amount equal to the rent chargeable for a renewal
lease."" The court found section 226-b to be governing, regardless
of the fact that the lease contained a covenant by the landlord not
to unreasonably withhold consent held:
We believe that a careful textual analysis of [Real Property Law] 226-b
points ineluctably to one and only one acceptable interpretation of the rem-
edies available to a tenant when a landlord unreasonably withholds consent
to sublet, that is: the tenant may decide to forego the subletting and remain
in occupancy or may elect to be released from further leasehold
obligations.
1 45
The court found that section 226-b overrode the common law rem-
edies and therefore a tenant did not have an absolute right to sub-
let over a landlord's objection, stating:
[W]hatever rights there may have been before the enactment of [Real
Property Law] 226-b the statute clearly enunciates a limited right as here
set forth, consequent on a finding of landlord's unreasonable refusal to con-
sent to subletting.1"
The First Department analogized section 226-b to section 236 of
the Real Property Law, 14 7 which protects the estate of a deceased
tenant from a residential leasehold liability when the landlord un-
reasonably refuses consent to an assignment." 8 Section 236, how-
ever, does not give the tenant a right to impose a new tenant on a
landlord, regardless of his unreasonable refusal to accept the pro-
posed assignee and similarly section 226-b bestows no such duty on
a landlord to accept a proposed sublessee.4"9
142. Id. at 12, col. 1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 11, col. 4.
146. Id. at 12, col. 1.
147. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1968). See also note 109 supra.
148. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
149. Id. See also Schnee v. Jonas Equities, Inc., 103 Misc. 2d 625, 426 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Civ.
Ct. 1980).
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The dissent in Lexann disagreed with the majority's application
of 226-b as eliminating the common law and statutory remedies
previously available to a tenant and substituting therefore a single
right to terminate the lease.150 The dissent stated that in the ab-
sence of a clear directive from the legislature that section 226-b
was designed to curtail the common law and statutory rights of
tenants, the section provided additional remedies rather than lim-
ited alternatives previously in existence, and the tenant in Lexann
should have had the option of terminating the lease, or subletting
despite the landlord's unreasonable refusal.151 Neither the majority
nor the dissent in Lexann recognized the importance of the lease
provision in which the landlord covenanted not to unreasonably
withhold consent and which the landlord violated. In such a case
the common law rule and remedies should apply enforcing the
lease provision and not section 226-b and its remedies.15 2 The First
Department should have enforced the provision as was done in
Feldman and presumably allowed the subtenant to remain in
possession.
The First Department again considered the scope of the rights
afforded to residential tenants by section 226-b, in the appeal of
Pacer Realty Associates v. Lasky.155 Although the court was not
presented with a lease containing a covenant by the landlord not to
unreasonably withhold consent to a sublease, it found its determi-
nation in Lexann to be dispositive authority for the determination
of Lasky.1 54 The First Department affirmed the lower court's hold-
ing that pursuant to section 226-b, where a landlord unreasonably
withholds consent to a sublease, the tenant has the right to request
that he be released from the lease, but he has no right to put a
subtenant in possession. 155
A concurring opinion, written by the same judge who dissented
in Lexann, distinguished Lasky from Lexann pointing out that in
Lexann the tenants there expressly relied on a lease provision
150. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
151. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 12, col. 1 (Asch, J.,
dissenting).
152. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
153. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (lst Dep't Jan. 22, 1981), aff'g No. L. &
T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980).
154. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436, slip op. at ii (1st Dep't Jan. 22, 1981).
155. Id.
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which obligated the landlord not to unreasonably withhold his con-
sent to a sublease. 5 The concurring opinion in Lasky stated that
section 226-b should not be construed to restrict the rights of the
tenant suing for breach of such a lease provision. 67 Although the
concurrence deferred to the precedent of Lexann, it stated that the
statute, if interpreted to annul a tenant's common law right to sub-
lease, would reward landlords who unreasonably deny consent by
increasing the possibility that they will be able to obtain vacan-
cies.' 6 Judge Asch wrote that the statute should be interpreted to
confirm tenants' pre-existing rights, and listed these rights as be-
ing: "the tenant may sublet, or he may sue for damages, or bring
an action for declaratory judgment or (now by virtue of the stat-
ute) he may request that landlord release him from the lease." 9
When a lease has a covenant by a landlord not to unreasonably
withhold consent to a sublease, then as the Feldman court held,' 60
the common law rules and remedies should be applied.
As the concurring opinion in Lasky cogently noted, section 226-b
was not intended to limit the common law rights and remedies of
tenants by substituting a statutory cause of action."' Where the
landlord covenants to give a tenant more rights than the statute
provides, the statute should not be applied in lieu of the lease pro-
vision.' 8 A landlord, however, cannot limit a tenant's rights under
section 226-b. 68 Section 226-b was not intended to give tenants
the right to sublease where a landlord unreasonably withholds con-
sent. The tenant has the right to sublease under the common law if
the landlord violates a leasehold covenant not to unreasonably
withhold consent to a sublease or if the lease contains no sublet-
ting provision of any kind.'6
156. Id., slip op. at 1 (Asch, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4 (Asch, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 4-5 (Asch, J., concurring).
160. Feldman v. Simon Bros. Mgmt. Co., N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1980, at 6, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.).
161. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436, slip op. at 4 (Asch, J., concurring).
162. See notes 21-55 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 2
(Sup. Ct.).
164. See notes 23-55 supra and accompanying text.
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V. Legislative History and Statutory Construction of
Section 226-b
A. Legislative History of Section 226-b
The original version of section 226-b was jointly introduced by
Assemblyman Charles E. Schumer and Senator Donald M.
Halperin on January 8, 1975.165 The supporting memorandum of
Senator Halperin stated: "[tlhis bill provides that a tenant shall
have the right to sublease his premises with the consent of the
landlord. Housing shortages and inequities to tenants may be alle-
viated by this bill through the allowance of a tenant to sublease his
premises when they are not in his use." 16' Following three amend-
ments to the bill by the Judiciary Committees in both the Assem-
bly and Senate, the bill was signed into law by Governor Hugh L.
Carey on June 3, 1975, and it took effect immediately. 167 On June
18, 1975, amended section 226-b was jointly introduced by the
same Assembly and Senate sponsors. 1 The supporting memoran-
dum of Senator Halperin, entitled, "Subleasing Clarification," ex-
plained, "the amendment is to make certain additions to the stat-
ute as originally enacted. Chapter 146 of the laws of 1975 added
section 226-b to the Real Property Law and granted tenants the
right to sublease. The amendments would benefit both tenant and
landlord by stating in clearer language the obligations of both
parties." 169
Subdivision one of the original version was amended to substi-
tute the following language: "If the landlord unreasonably with-
holds consent for such sublease, the landlord must release the ten-
ant from the lease upon request of the tenant." [italics indicates
substituted text] for: "If the landlord unreasonably withholds con-
sent for such sublease, he must agree to release the tenant from
the lease or accept the sublessee [italics indicates deleted text].70
Other changes in the bill included clarifications of the tenant's ob-
ligation to notify the landlord of intent to sublease and an exemp-
165. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 27-28, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05 (Sup. Ct.
1980).
166. N.Y. LEGiS. ANNUAL 305 (1975).
167. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 28, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
168. Id.
169. N.Y. LEGIS. ANNUAL 305 (1975).
170. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1980). See note 13 supra.
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tion of proprietary leases from the section.'
In neither of Senator Halperin's legislative memoranda was
there a reference to the fact that the original version of section
226-b included a requirement that a landlord who unreasonably
withheld consent to a sublease must "accept the sublessee" and
the amended version deleted this important language,7 2 effectively
changing the statutory remedy. The Kruger court relied on Sena-
tor Halperin's legislative memoranda to interpret the legislative in-
tent of this deletion.'1" The Kruger court erred in deemphasizing
the importance of the amendment of section 226-b, which excluded
the language that "the landlord must accept the sublessee" if the
landlord unreasonably withholds consent, and thereby eliminated
this remedy.'7 4 The fact that Senator Halperin's memoranda failed
to mention the remedial change cannot be used to undermine the
significance. 7 5
B. Statutory Construction of Section 226-b
1. Plain Meaning Rule
The Kruger court applied the "plain meaning" rule of statutory
construction to determine the legislative intent underlying section
226-b: "Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous the
171. Subdivision 2 was amended to provide that any request to sublet must be accompa-
nied by the written consent of any co-tenant or guarantor and the name, business and home
address of the proposed sublessee, and within ten days after such request is mailed, the
landlord may ask the sender for additional information so that the landlord can determine if
rejection of such request would be unreasonable. Subdivision 3 was amended to include that
the section shall not apply to a proprietary lease and defined proprietary. Amended section
226-b became law on July 29, 1975. Id.
172. N.Y. LEGIs. ANNUAL 305 (1975). A second amendment to section 226-b, effective on
May 26, 1976, included provisions relating to the right to assign leases. N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 281
(1976).
173. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 30, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 306 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
174. Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (1st Dep't Jan. 22, 1981), af'g No. L. &
T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980; Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18,
1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't); 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune and Saccaman, N.Y.L.J., July 17,
1980, at 11, col. 6 (Civ. Ct.). Accord, Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb.
6, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
175. As one legislative historian has stated:
The absence of discussion of an issue in the legislative materials may be less decisive
than other legislative history, but it is sometimes a factor in statutory construction
and may be "pregnant with significance," particularly where some striking change is
claimed without support in the legislative history.
G. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HisTORy 40 (1979).
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court should construe the plain meaning of the words used.' 17 6
In so doing, the Kruger court found that the language of section
226-b meant that where the landlord unreasonably withheld con-
sent to a sublease, the legislature intended that the tenant should
have the option of subleasing or terminating the lease.17 Lexann
correctly found the plain meaning of the statute was not to provide
the remedy of subleasing without valid consent.178 Because of the
landlord's covenant, however, Lexann should not have applied sec-
tion 226-b.
Rather, Lexann should have applied the. common law rights and
remedies of tenants.17 9 Kruger, on the other hand, because there
was no express covenant by the landlord in the lease, found section
226-b applicable.180 But, Kruger should have followed Lasky's cor-
rect interpretation 81 of the statutory remedies available under sec-
tion 226-b.
2. Mitigation of Damages
The Kruger court suggested that the statutory requirement that
consent could not be unreasonably withheld may have been in-
tended to impose a duty on the landlord to mitigate the tenant's
damages by releasing him from the lease. 82 By not holding the
tenant liable for the remainder of the rent for the unexpired term
of the lease, a tenant's damages are mitigated. 183 At common law
the landlord had no duty to mitigate a tenant's damages.' 8' In view
of the developing recognition of a landlord's duty to mitigate dam-
ages occurring in New York at the time section 226-b was en-
acted, 85 mitigation of damages may have been a remedial intent of
176. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 29, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 305, (quoting Patrol-
men's Benevolent Ass'n. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 209, 359 N.E.2d 1338,
1341, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 547 (1976)).
177. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 29-32, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 305-07.
178. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 12, col. 1 (lst Dep't).
179. See notes 23-55 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text.
182. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 31, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 307 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
183. See Posner & Gallet, Mitigation of Damages in Residential Lease Breaches,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
184. Id.
185. Courts are modernizing concepts of landlord and tenant law and some courts have
held that a landlord has some obligation to relet premises when a tenant vacates before the
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the statute. In 1975, when original section 226-b was enacted, New
York common law did not generally recognize a landlord's duty to
mitigate a tenant's damages, although such a duty is more widely
recognized today."" In 1980, there still had been neither a statu-
tory enactment nor a judicial interpretation that expressly man-
dated mitigation of damages where a tenant vacated before the ex-
piration of a lease.1 87
In Lefrak v. Lambert,"1 8 a New York court held that landlords
are under a duty to mitigate a tenant's damages by making a good
faith attempt to re-let vacated apartments. The court awarded the
landlord only three months' rent because of a failure to mitigate
the tenant's damages following the tenant's abandonment of the
apartment prior to the expiration of the three-year term of the
lease.1 89 The Second Department, however, modified the judgment
on appeal to allow the landlord to recover rent for the entire seven-
teen-month period the apartment remained vacant. 9 ' The court
found that because the landlord made reasonable and diligent ef-
forts to re-let the apartment, and eventually did so, there was no
need to decide whether a rule should be adopted which would
modernize the common law by obligating a landlord to mitigate
damages by reletting abandoned premises. 9'
The rule established in Lefrak imposed substantial hardship on
the tenant.192 This hardship is eliminated by section 226-b which
places on the landlord a duty to mitigate damages when a tenant
terminates the lease before expiration of the term.1"1 Although the
expiration of the lease. Id. See Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ.
Ct.), modified, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (2d Dep't 1978). See also Schnee v. Jonas
Equities, Inc., 103 Misc. 2d 625, 426 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (holding a vacancy result-
ing from death terminated the lease by operation of law and the deceased's estate was not
liable for rent and reletting costs).
186. Schnee v. Jonas Equities, Inc., 103 Misc. 2d 625, 426 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
187. See Birchwood Assocs. v. Stern, 88 Misc. 2d 937, 390 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. T. 1976).
See also Schnee v. Jonas Equities, Inc., 103 Misc. 2d 625, 426 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Civ. Ct. 1980)
(recommending the obligation to mitigate damages as a subject for legislative inquiry).
188. Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. 1976), modified, 93
Misc. 2d 623, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. T. 1978).
189. Id. at 205, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
190. Id. at 633, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Pacer Realty Assocs. v. Lasky, No. 80-436 (1st Dep't Jan. 22, 1981), aff'g No. L.
& T. 32683-80 (Civ. Ct. May 29, 1980); Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18,
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Kruger court noted "the subject rent-stabilized apartment is a val-
uable asset, ' 194 the purpose of the statute was to help a tenant who
needed to vacate an apartment before the expiration of the lease
term."9 5 As a corollary to the growing recognition of a landlord's
duty to mitigate a tenant's damages, the legislature in section 226-
b codified a landlord's duty to eliminate tenant's damages. Where
consent to a sublease is unreasonably withheld, the tenant has the
option of terminating the lease without further liability or remain-
ing as the tenant under the lease."
VI. Conclusion
If a landlord and tenant contract to allow subleasing with the
landlord's consent and the landlord agrees not to withhold consent
unreasonably, the contract between the parties should be enforced.
Where the lease contains no provision requiring reasonableness on
the part of the landlord the remedies provided by section 226-b
should be applied. If a landlord unreasonably withholds consent to
a sublease under section 226-b, the tenant's remedy is clearly pro-
vided by the statute: the tenant may continue his tenancy or may
terminate the lease without further obligation. 97 Although the
statute purports to give tenants the right to sublease it does not
give that right without landlord consent.
Section 226-b, however, was not intended to limit a tenant's
common law right to sublet. The common law right to sublet is
available to a tenant where the lease contains no subletting provi-
sion or where the landlord expressly covenants not to unreasonably
withhold consent to a sublease. In this instance, a tenant's reme-
dies are to: 1) sublease the apartment in spite of the landlord's
refusal; or 2) sue for a declaratory judgment to determine whether
consent has been unreasonably withheld and either obtain specific
1980, at 11, col. 3 (1st Dep't); 39 Remsen Co. v. Braune and Saccaman, N.Y.L.J., July 17,
1980, at 11, col. 6 (Civ. Ct.). See also Grayshaw v. New Amsterdam Apts. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb.
6, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
194. Kruger v. Page Mgmt. Co., 105 Misc. 2d at 33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
195. "The intent, and I think the effect, of the law i§ not to allow tenants to hang on to
their apartments but rather to help the tenant who is hard pressed to get out .... It puts
the obligation on the tenant to find a sublessee but it doesn't require the landlord to take
him." To Sublet or Leave is a Right by Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1976, at B1, col. 5 (quot-
ing Assemblyman Charles E. Schumer, co-sponsor of § 226-b).
196. Lexann Realty Co. v. Deitchman, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1980, at 11, cols. 4-5.
197. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
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performance or recover damages. 198 In addition, the remedial pro-
visions of section 226-b are available to a tenant with such a lease.
Section 226-b, however, is not a statutory restriction on a tenant's
common law right to sublease.
Courts are not in agreement as to when section 226-b applies,
particularly in instances where the lease contains a subleasing pro-
vision, nor are they in accord as to whether the statute gives a ten-
ant the right to sublease if a landlord unreasonably refuses con-
sent. As the Grayshaw court found, section 226-b's purpose is
clearly remedial 99 and courts, when confronted with subleasing
and assignment disputes, should distinguish the statute's applica-
tion from the operation of leasehold provisions and common law
remedies.
Carolyn Debra Karp
198. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text.
199. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 5, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.).
1981]

